















































 On July 1, 1776, during the agitating days of the Continental Congress’s contentious 
debate to separate from Great Britain, Pennsylvanian delegate John Dickinson passionately 
explained that to declare independence would be “to brave the storm in a skiff made of paper.”1 
Throughout the tumultuous years before and during the start of the revolutionary war, Dickinson 
was the acclaimed leader of the “cool faction”2 of colonial statesmen who, compared to those 
whom they considered to be radical delegates, respected the colonists’ cause of opposing 
England’s political oppression yet did not believe complete separation from the crown was 
necessarily essential at the time. The so-called “moderates,” including John Jay, James Duane, 
and Robert Morris, alongside John Dickinson, are ignored in their role in the revolution because 
of the attention paid only to the patriotic radicals, like Samuel and John Adams, and the loyalist 
supporters of Britain. But the peaceful and diplomatically sound intentions of this faction of men 
were incredibly sincere in promoting the interests of the American colonies. The moderates’ 
influence on the other Congressional delegates and the colonial population was crucially 
important in warning against drastic revolutionary steps that would hurt rather than help the 
American cause in initiating immediate repercussions from the British government and her 
military forces.  
 The general beliefs of these moderate colonial politicians were cemented primarily 
during the growing conflict between England and her colonies based on the various acts passed 
by the British Parliament. These acts of the 1760’s, according to Parliament, were a logical way 
to raise revenue to help pay for the French and Indian War. The views of Pennsylvanian John 
Dickinson became extremely popular when he published a series of letters under the pseudonym                                                         1 Library of Congress, Letters of Delegates to Congress, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field%28DOCID+@lit%28dg004274%29%29, IV 353. 2 McCullough, David. John Adams. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2001. 93. 
“the Farmer” from Pennsylvania, protesting the Townshend Acts of 1767.3 Published numerous 
times throughout all of the English colonies in North America, the vastly popular articles of “the 
Farmer” were widely known by any colonist who read the newspaper during the 1760’s and 
1770’s. By writing as a farmer who was simply trying to get by in life with what he could 
produce, Dickinson appealed and connected to his countrymen by describing himself as “a 
Farmer, settled after a Variety of Fortunes…in the Province of Pennsylvania…received a liberal 
Education, and have been engaged in the busy Scenes of Life. My Farm is small; my Servants 
are few…I have a little Money at Interest; I wish for no more.”4 Dickinson automatically gained 
a popular reputation as a voice of protest for the colonists against the direction that their mother 
country was taking. Arguing that the taxes of the Townshend Acts were simply unconstitutional 
because their goal was only to gain revenue, Dickinson claimed that England was beginning to 
encroach on colonists’ liberties and opportunities to earn an honest living. Parliament had 
already passed such measures like the Sugar, Currency, Quartering and Stamp Acts in the early 
1760’s to deal with the Seven Years’ War’s debt, prompting immense anger and unrest in the 
colonies.5 The evils of British policy were detrimental to the English colonies as a whole, and 
according to Dickinson, all inhabitants had to take this as a grim reality: “But whoever seriously 
considers the Matter, must perceive that a dreadful Stroke is aimed at the Liberty of these 
Colonies…for the Cause of one is the Cause of all.”6 Dickinson believed the colonists’ rightful 
liberties were at risk, and that it was time to do something to make Parliament listen. But to do 
                                                        3 Ibid., 94. 4 “Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania,” Pennsylvania Gazette, Philadelphia, Penn. Dec. 3, 
1767. 5 Rakove, Jack. Revolutionaries. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing 
Company, 2010. 19-26.  6 “Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania,” Pennsylvania Gazette, Philadelphia, Penn. Dec. 3, 
1767. 
this correctly, “the Farmer” made it clear that radical proposals (such as direct military conflict) 
were not the best option: “I am by no Means fond of inflammatory Measures; I detest them. I 
should be sorry that any thing should be done, which might justly displease our Sovereign, or our 
Mother Country.”7 As the prominent leader of the moderate politicians, Dickinson’s belief that 
the connection between mother country and her colonies was still important no matter what 
resentments dominated the “cool faction’s” attitudes. A 1774 article from the Connecticut 
Courant, quoting what “the American Farmer” had said in a letter, describes the unhappy 
situation in the colonies and what can be done about it:  
To preserve [the] union and promote the happiness and prosperity of both countries, let 
us resolve to maintain our liberty. But in doing this, when any difference arises, on the 
present unhappy occasion, let us act so as to leave room for a return of the old good 
humour, confidence and affection, which has subsisted between Great Britain and this 
country, since the settlement of the colonies. 8 
 
This was the goal of moderate delegates like John Dickinson during the pre-revolution years: 
they wished to promote the cause of the colonies against these oversteps on their property and 
rights, but not to the point of fighting a war with the powerful British empire and eventually 
declaring independence.  
 While the ideas of how to force England to listen to her colonies varied for colonial 
statesmen, moderates and radicals definitely had their similarities. The most obvious consensus 
among these politicians (from Dickinson to Sam Adams) was that Britain’s actions were clearly 
intruding into colonists’ lives by threatening their rightful liberties as Englishmen; they were 
being defied by the extremely unpopular acts that England had passed for the colonies, mostly to 
                                                        7 Ibid. 8 “The following is a Copy of a letter…,” Connecticut Courant (Hartford, Connecticut), Feb. 1-8, 
1774. 
raise revenue for the heavy debts created from the Seven Years’ War.9 In a 1772 Massachusetts 
newspaper article, the journalist explains that he cannot  
conceive what greater marks of the insecurity of our freedom, we possibly can have, than 
what have been erouding on us…they have…wrested from the industrious farmers the 
fruit of their labours and the sweat of their brow, and turned out their wives and little 
ones to starve…so notoriously unfriendly to the Liberties of all America.10  
 
The English inhabitants on the eastern coast of North America had reason to consider Parliament 
as a threat since it was being so “unfriendly” to their interests. Most colonial delegates to the 
Continental Congresses in 1774 and 1775 recognized this as a huge concern and were thus 
looking out for the economic well being of their fellow colonists. But the resolution of these 
taxing concerns was hotly debated between delegates. Most statesmen, other than the moderates 
like Dickinson, favored defending themselves with weapons if it was necessary: “if that same 
magnanimity of soul, which preserved them so resigned to the first appearance of oppression, 
obliges them at last to appeal to the sword, their conduct, in each situation would be 
estimable.”11 Radical delegates, especially Samuel Adams who had expanded the formation of 
committees of correspondence, favored activities that would bring revenge and physical harm 
(such as tarring and feathering) to British administrative officials in the colonies; Adams claimed 
that Britain’s leaders wanted to have dominion over America because of their love for power and 
thus limit the rights of colonists.12 The cause for the colonies was serious in that “they only 
deserve liberty, who so well understand it, so passionately love it, so temperately enjoy it, and so 
wisely, bravely and virtuously assert, maintain and defend it.”13 Moderates were unsure and 
reluctant to assert violence against Britain that would result in a full-scale war that the colonies                                                         9 Rakove, Revolutionaries, 20-21. 10 “Massachusetts Spy,” Essex Gazette (Salem, Massachusetts), Jan. 7-14, 1772. 1. 11 Ibid., 2.  12 Rakove, Revolutionaries, 101. 13 “Massachusetts Spy,” Essex Gazette (Salem, Massachusetts), Jan. 7-14, 1772. 2. 
were not ready for; they had to face the dilemma of combining military action, with George 
Washington’s appointment to organize a Continental Army, with the desperate hope that Britain 
would begin serious negotiations.  
 King George III’s complete ignoring of the Second Continental Congress’ Olive Branch 
Petition of 1775, urged notably by moderates under Dickinson to avoid a war, proved to be an 
overlooking of the good intentions of the “cool faction.” Immediately after the devastating events 
at Lexington and Concord in April 1775, a Connecticut newspaper quoting a London letter 
explained how “the death warrant was passed” in Parliament, “and the colonies declared rebels. 
The petitions and all attempts have failed.”14 In a letter to Arthur Lee on April 29 of that same 
year, John Dickinson wrote, “Why have We been so rashly declared Rebels? Why have 
Divisions been sent to disarm Us? Why Orders to commence Hostilities?”15 The misfortune 
Britain was inflicting on the colonies was now caused by deliberate armed force, when it had 
been by legislation the decade before. Dickinson continued to wonder “what Topicks of 
Reconciliation” could now be proposed to their countrymen, and what “Reason to hope, that 
those Ministers & Representatives will not be supported throughout the Tragedy as They have 
been thro the first Act?”16 Suggestions for negotiating with Parliament and the crown for 
peaceful resolutions appeared increasingly unlikely after this first violent battle at Lexington and 
Concord in Massachusetts. One article from the Pennsylvania Evening Post quoting a London 
letter read “from present appearances a reconciliation between us and Great Britain is at further 
                                                        14 “New York, Extract of a Letter from London,” Connecticut Journal (New Haven, Conn.), 
May 3, 1775.  15 Library of Congress, Letters of Delegates to Congress, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field%28DOCID+@lit%28dg001267%29%29, I 332. 16 Ibid. 
distance than we of late had reason to hope.”17 Moderate statesmen felt despair as the escalating 
conflict with their mother country was taking place. Hopes for some sort of peace resolution still 
dictated the attitudes of moderates like John Dickinson, yet the radicals like John Adams 
believed war and eventually independence were inevitable since the British were not to be 
trusted. John Adams had wrote, “powder and artillery are the most efficaciously sure and 
infallible conciliatory measures we can adopt.”18 
 With the onset of the war against Britain in 1775, moderates’ fears grew as the prospect 
of declaring independence began to be debated in public and in the Continental Congress. The 
publication of Thomas Paine’s Common Sense in January 1776 completely riled the colonists in 
the war effort against England and changed the political situation in the Continental Congress. 
Paine outright ridiculed the moderates’ goals for reconciliation; delegates favoring it were 
“interested men, who are not to be trusted; weak men, who cannot see; prejudiced men, who will 
not see; and a certain set of moderate men, who think better of the European world than it 
deserves; and this last class…will be the cause of more calamities to this continent, than all the 
other three.”19 While moderates refuted these allegations that insinuated that they were loyalists 
since they were just as critical of British policies as were the radicals, calls for independence 
began springing up in the Continental Congress.20 After John Adams submitted a preamble that 
called for no reconciliation and a path to being independent, moderate James Duane demanded, 
“Why all this haste? Why all this driving?”21 Moderates did not necessarily think that now was 
the time to declare independence; they ultimately worried that the timing of such a drastic event                                                         17 “Extract of a letter from New York,” Pennsylvania Evening Post (Philadelphia, Penn.), Apr. 
24, 1775.  18 McCullough, John Adams, 95. 19 Paine, Thomas. Common Sense. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001. 91. 20 Rakove, Revolutionaries, 95.  21 McCullough, John Adams, 109. 
would initiate disastrous repercussions for the colonies in terms of their own governments being 
extremely weak, or not having the ability to defend themselves against the notorious British 
army if alliances with other colonies and even France and other nations were not worked out 
properly. A Virginia Gazette article from April 12, 1776 read  
The name of independence is accompanied with the terrifying ideas of an everlasting 
separation from Great Britain, of the destruction of the finest constitution in the world (as 
the phrase is) and of the substitution of republican governments in the colonies. Then 
follow a dreadful train of domestick convulsions in each republick, of jealousies, 
dissentions, wars, and all their attendant miseries…22 
 
Independence might be able to unite all colonists to fight against the approaching British army, 
but moderates knew it had the potential of causing domestic problems of weakness and differing 
factions. (After refusing to support the resolution for independence of July 2, 1776 that 
eventually passed, Robert Morris wrote that the decision to separate “has caused division when 
we wanted Union.”23) Not only were measures supporting independence threatening the 
colonies’ unity, but also statesmen would be getting rid of the world’s “finest constitution.” 
Additionally, all colonial delegates knew that declaring independence had to be legitimate and 
strategic. The debating statesmen had to be sure that colonists felt that the relationship with the 
king was broken since this ensuing war was practically being created by the refusal of George III 
to protect his colonies. The other reason to publicly express being independent was to secure the 
aid of foreign countries through alliances.24 These reasons proved vitally important in the final 
decision to declare independence. While a majority of moderates did not support the resolution 
to separate from England, they came to agree with radicals in that independence was strongly 
influenced by Britain’s missteps in the first place since Parliament and the crown miscalculated                                                         22 “To Mr. Alexander Purdie,” Virginia Gazette (Williamsburg, Virg.), April 12, 1776. 23 Library of Congress, Letters of Delegates to Congress, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field%28DOCID+@lit%28dg001267%29%29, IV 511. 24 Rakove, Revolutionaries, 99.  
the volatility of the colonists’ concerns and the faction of loyalists and delegates wanting 
reconciliation.25 Moderate delegate Robert Morris had wrote 
Great Britain may thank herself for this Event, for whatever might have been the original 
designs of some Men in promoting the present Contest I am sure that America in general 
never set out with any View or desire of establishing an Independant Empire. They have 
been drove into it step by step with a reluctant on their part that has been manifested in all 
their proceedings, & yet I dare say our Enemies will assert that it was planned from the 
first movements.26 
 
Here, Morris was most likely talking about the Adamses when he mentioned “some Men.” 
Moderates believed that Parliament and the crown, not American interests, caused this struggle 
and eventual separation with Great Britain. Delegates like Dickinson, Morris, and Duane had 
been consistently favorable to colonists’ interests in warning against a war with England, and 
their views were ultimately reinforced with this general consensus that Britain had miserably 
ignored chances for negotiation. Their major role in maintaining an alternate perspective on the 
conflict with England forced serious debate about the risks of war in the colonies. 
 What might the American Revolution have looked like without the moderate statesmen’s 
influence? Hostilities with the British army might have begun earlier, more risks would probably 
have been taken, and the war could have even been lost if the consistent pessimism and sincerity 
of the moderates was not present in the Continental Congress in supporting steps to ultimately 
separate from their mother country. It could even be argued that the revolution could have turned 
out as bloody as later revolutions in France and Haiti. The influence of the moderates truly made 
the revolution a lot more conservative than it could have been, and in comparison to the French 
and Haitian revolutions, that is probably a good thing.  
                                                         25 Ibid., 102. 26 Library of Congress, Letters of Delegates to Congress, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field%28DOCID+@lit%28dg001267%29%29, IV 147. 
 
 
 
 
 
